Almost every paper on LLMs as financial forecasters treats the market as an exogenous system. The model looks at data, makes a prediction, and the prediction has no effect on what it's predicting. This is the standard assumption. It is also, in a narrow but important sense, false.

George Soros spent decades arguing the opposite. His theory of reflexivity holds that market prices don't just reflect fundamentals — they feed back into them. Investor beliefs shape prices, prices shape corporate behaviour, corporate behaviour shapes fundamentals, fundamentals shape beliefs. The loop is closed. A forecaster is not an outside observer. They are a participant in the system they are trying to predict.

A paper published in May 2026 asked a simple but underexplored question: if you tell a frontier LLM about reflexivity — explicitly, as context — does it forecast boom-bust cycles better?

// Paper
Reflexivity as Prompt: Does Awareness of Self-Reinforcing Market Dynamics Improve LLMs as Financial Market Forecasters?
Eugene Park  ·  arXiv:2606.00061  ·  May 19, 2026  ·  q-fin.ST  ·  arxiv.org/abs/2606.00061

Evaluates GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Pro under four accumulating zero-shot conditions across the dot-com bubble (1996–2001) and global financial crisis (2004–2009). Primary metric: directional forecasting accuracy. Secondary metric: Sharpe ratio of an implied long/cash strategy. All inputs anonymized and normalized to guard against memorization.

// The experimental design

The setup is careful in ways that matter. Historical price and market data from two episodes — the dot-com bubble and the GFC — are anonymized and normalized before being fed to the models. The normalization is intended to prevent the models from recognizing the specific historical period and pattern-matching on memorized outcomes. Whether it succeeds is one of the central questions I'll return to.

Each model is evaluated under four conditions of increasing theoretical scaffolding:

Condition 1 (baseline) — raw normalized price data, no additional context. The model forecasts direction from the data alone.

Condition 2 — the model is told it is making a financial forecast during a market cycle.

Condition 3 — the model receives a description of reflexivity theory: that prices and fundamentals form a feedback loop, and that self-reinforcing dynamics cause trends to persist longer than fundamental value would suggest.

Condition 4 — the model receives the full Soros reflexivity framework including boom-bust cycle structure: the initial trend, its amplification through feedback, the moment of inflection, and the eventual correction.

Fig 1 — Experimental conditions: accumulating theoretical scaffolding
C1 — Baseline Normalized price data only. C2 — Context Data + "you are making a financial forecast" C3 — Reflexivity Data + C2 + feedback loop theory C4 — Full Soros Data + C3 + boom-bust cycle structure + inflection point detection Accumulating zero-shot conditions · Park 2026 · arXiv:2606.00061

// What happens when you add the theory

Directional accuracy improves as the scaffolding accumulates. The models with full reflexivity context (C4) outperform the baseline (C1) on both episodes. The improvement is not marginal — it's consistent across all three models and both historical periods. The Sharpe ratio of the implied long/cash strategy also increases, which matters: accuracy that doesn't survive trading costs is the problem the Zhang & Zhang paper documented extensively, and here the economic signal is positive even at C4.

Fig 2 — Directional accuracy by condition and episode (schematic from paper findings)
70% 60% 50% ~45% C1 Baseline C2 Context C3 Reflexivity C4 Full Soros Dot-com bubble (1996–2001) Global financial crisis (2004–2009) Schematic representation of paper findings · exact figures not published in abstract · Park 2026

The dot-com bubble shows stronger improvement than the GFC. This is plausible: the dot-com bubble is a cleaner example of Soros's original framework — a clear self-reinforcing narrative (internet stocks must rise because the internet changes everything), amplified by retail participation, followed by a sharp inflection. The GFC is a more complex multi-stage event with regulatory, liquidity, and contagion dynamics that reflexivity theory doesn't fully capture. A model given the reflexivity frame may apply it more confidently to the cleaner case.

// The confound the paper can't fully resolve

Here's the problem. Anonymization and normalization guard against the most obvious form of memorization — the model recognizing "1999 NASDAQ" from the numbers and recalling the outcome. But they don't guard against a subtler form: the model recognizing the shape of a boom-bust cycle from normalized data and retrieving learned associations between that shape and its typical resolution.

LLMs have read a great deal of financial history. The dot-com bubble has a recognizable pattern — exponential growth phase, plateau, rapid decline — that is structurally similar across many historical episodes. When the paper provides the Soros framework in C4, it is simultaneously providing two things: a theory for why prices behave as they do, and a narrative template that may help the model recognize which historical episodes the anonymized data most resembles.

The question that can't be answered from the paper's experimental design: is the accuracy improvement in C4 driven by genuine theoretical reasoning about reflexivity, or by the reflexivity frame priming the model to recognize a boom-bust narrative shape that it has memorized? These produce identical outputs on this test. They have completely different implications for whether the effect would generalize to a novel market episode the model hasn't seen in any form.

The paper's authors acknowledge the memorization concern and address it through normalization. That's the right move. But the narrative-recognition confound is harder — it doesn't require the model to remember specific numbers, only to recognize structural patterns. And LLMs trained on internet text have seen boom-bust cycle narratives described hundreds of thousands of times, across every bubble in recorded financial history.

Fig 3 — Two explanations for the accuracy improvement: underdetermined by the experimental design
C4: Data + Soros framework Explanation A Model reasons about feedback dynamics and updates beliefs Explanation B Framework primes recognition of memorized bubble narrative shape Identical output → same accuracy

// Three models, one pattern

One of the more interesting findings is that the improvement holds across all three frontier models — GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Pro — despite their different architectures and training regimes. The direction of improvement is consistent even if the magnitude differs. This is some evidence against a pure memorization explanation: you'd expect different models to memorize differently, and if the effect were purely about recognizing historical patterns, you'd expect more variance between models with different training data compositions.

It's not conclusive — all three models have been trained on significant overlapping financial text — but it does suggest that something more general than a specific memorized association is driving the result. Whether that general thing is "genuine understanding of reflexivity" or "general competence at recognizing boom-bust narrative structure" remains open.

// What this is actually evidence for

Setting the confound aside, the paper establishes something useful. Providing theoretical context to LLMs in a financial forecasting task improves performance. This matters for practitioners thinking about prompt design, not just researchers thinking about market theory.

The implication isn't "give your trading model Soros." It's narrower and more actionable: when asking an LLM to forecast a dynamic with a known structural mechanism — a feedback loop, a mean-reversion process, a regime shift pattern — providing the theoretical description of that mechanism improves the output. The model has already read every paper on reflexivity, every paper on momentum, every paper on mean reversion. The right context prompt may unlock that knowledge in a more targeted way than asking it to reason from data alone.

Whether the mechanism is genuine theoretical reasoning or sophisticated pattern priming probably doesn't matter for deployment. What matters is whether it generalises to novel episodes. That experiment hasn't been run yet.


// The Missing Experiment

Run C4 on a market episode the models demonstrably haven't seen

The dot-com bubble and GFC are the two most-documented market episodes in financial history. They appear in every financial economics textbook, every case study, every market retrospective. A model trained on internet text has seen their narrative structure — even anonymized and normalized — described thousands of times in ways that may produce recognizable shape signatures. The experiment that would actually settle the confound: evaluate the same four conditions on a recent, novel, less-narrativized market dislocation — one that occurred close to the models' training cutoffs and has seen limited retrospective analysis. If the accuracy improvement in C4 is driven by genuine reflexivity reasoning rather than narrative recognition, it should persist. If it's driven by pattern priming from historical narrative structure, it should attenuate substantially on the less-documented episode. That experiment would separate the two explanations. The paper doesn't run it.


Research notes. All sources linked.